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ABSTRACT 
Well-being and agency are the two pillars of the capability approach. In this paper we 
emphasize that a proper analysis of agency requires an explicit treatment of social 
interaction. We show that once agency is framed within an interactive context, the two 
dimensions of individual action are strongly intertwined. In addition, interdependency hints 
for collective behaviour, thus, developing an example introduced by Sen (1990), we provide 
a simple threshold model explaining labour market participation of women as an emergent 
phenomenon. The model is able to provide an alternative explanation of extreme variations 
of this phenomenon in culturally homogeneous areas. 
Keywords: Amartya Sen, well-being measurement, agency, capability, Workers, Women 
RESUME 
Le bien-être et la qualité d’agence sont deux des piliers de l’approche des capabilités. Cet 
article met en avant que toute analyse sérieuse de la qualité d’agence doit inclure l’étude de 
l’interaction sociale. Nous montrons qu’une fois inscrite dans le contexte d’interactions 
sociales les deux dimensions de l’action individuelle (bien-être ; agencéité) sont 
inséparablement unies. Leur interdépendance signale l’existence de comportements 
collectifs. Aussi sur la base d’un exemple introduit par Sen en 1990 nous proposons un 
modèle de seuil simple qui explique la participation au marché du travail des femmes comme 
un phénomène d’émergence. Ce modèle fournit ainsi une explication alternative aux 
variations extrêmes de cette participation dans un contexte culturel par ailleurs largement 
homogène.   
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“Without one there cannot be many 
and without many it is not possible 
to refer to one. Therefore, one and 
many arise dependently and such 
phenomena do not have the sign of 
inherent existence.” 
   N g rjuna, Seventy Stanzas on 
Emptiness 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The operationalization of abstract theories, in addition to offer an opportunity for empirical 
validation, forces scholars to spell out aspects otherwise neglected or underestimated. The 
empirical analysis carried out by Mathias and Maria Teresa Herrera-Nebel in their project 
“Creating a Meta Capability Indicator: Agency and Responsibility” provides a clear example 
of this refinement process (2017 see their article in this volume)
1
. In fact, this project, which 
operationalizes agency within Sen’s capability approach, highlights the social dimension of 
agency and the necessity to take social interdependency into account in developing a 
satisfactory theory of agency.  
With the important exceptions of Sen (1990) and Ballet, Dubois and Mahieu (2007; 2014), 
the issue of social interdependence issue has been greatly overlooked by the capability 
literature on agency.
2
 To advance this stream of research, we elaborate on this issue and 
propose that social interaction makes the two dimensions strongly intertwined. We point out 
also that once agents are conceived within an interactive context, agency appears to be an 
emergent phenomenon and the issue of responsibility of public action assumes a more 
complex view than simply equalization of opportunity. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews well-being and agency in 
Sen’s capability approach. Section 3 deals with the issue of responsibility. Section 4 points 
out the social interactive nature dimension of agency and its interdependency with well-
being. Building on Sen, Section 5 develops a simple threshold model which shows the nature 
of emergent phenomenon of agency and is able to provide an alternative explanation for 
extreme variations of the labour market participation of women in the same cultural areas. 
Final conclusions are contained in Section 6. 
 
                                                 
1
 This is a revised version of the talk I delivered at the Workshop “Mesure de la responsabilité et 
politique de développement. Meta-capability measurement. Measure of Social and Individual 
Agency” Paris, 6-7 November 2014. I would like to thank the participants at the workshop for very 
helpful comments and the organizers for the opportunity to reflect upon the important issue of agency. 
Particular thanks to Mathias Nebel for thoughtful comments on an early draft of this paper. Usual 
caveats apply. 
2
 Sen (1990) clearly states that the gender division of labor within the household and even the 
household’s prosperity require the solution to two problems, one involving cooperation and the other 
conflict. Cooperation and conflict are notable examples of social interaction which can be formally 
analyzed by means of game theory (Sen: 1990, Section 4). 
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2. WELL-BEING AND AGENCY IN SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH  
According to the capability approach individuals are agents whose actions are aimed at 
taking care of either their well-being or their conception of the good (Sen: 1985, 206), the 
latter defining the agency dimension of the individual. The individual’s well-being may 
either completely define the individual’s objectives or may be only a part of them. Thus, 
agency and well-being, although sharing the common distinction in achievement and 
freedom (Sen: 1985, 203 ff.), must be usually kept distinct. The reason why agency is 
introduced in the capability approach can be traced back to the attempt to keep distance from 
the individualistic approach usually adopted in economics:  
“Agency provides space for a conception of freedom and responsibility that breaks 
decisively with any egoism that claims that humans are no more than – and are bound to be 
– ‘strict maximizers of a narrowly defined self-interest’” Crocker and Robeyns (2010, 76). 
In order to make agency a substantially distinct concept with respect to well-being the goals 
driving the action should not refer exclusively to subjective well-being. In fact, in pursuing 
his/her agency goal the agent’s well-being might even be compromised. This argument is 
clearly shown in the following example provided by Robeyns (2005): Anna and Becca are 
two sisters who live in a peaceful village in England and enjoy the same well-being levels. 
Both believe that the power of global corporations is undermining democracy, and that 
governments should prioritize global justice instead of the interests of global corporations. 
Anna decides to use her agency freedom to voice her political concern and eventually is 
jailed by the police during a demonstration against multinationals, thus her well-being is 
considerably lowered by her decision. In contrast, Becca does not want to sacrifice her well-
being for these agency goals and decides to stay home.
3
  
It is worth emphasizing two aspects in the previous example. First, agency requires freedom 
of choice, that is, the exercise of agency by Betta requires the possibility of choosing to 
participate at the demonstration. Second, an effective exercise of agency may require 
cooperation with other people. The former point has been widely discussed by the capability 
literature, especially in dealing with the role of freedom in determining the individual well-
being (Sen: 1988; Kuklys: 2005; D’Agata: 2007). Instead, the latter aspect has been greatly 
neglected, as it is usually implicitly assumed that each action is effective in attaining the 
desired goal. However, the effective exercise of agency should not be taken for granted since 
in the previous example Anna could not be successful in her decision, with possibly no effect 
on her well-being, if nobody or an insignificant number of people participated in the 
demonstration.  
3. AGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 
The importance of freedom in the capability approach explains the importance this approach 
should acknowledge to responsibility both in explaining individual actions and in providing 
                                                 
3
 It is possible to argue that the distinction between Anna and Betta’s choices is correct only if short-
terms effects are considered. If long term goals are introduced, then also Anna’s choice could be 
interpreted as a choice dictated by her well-being (see, for example, Rule (1989)). We do not consider 
any further this qualification. 
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a strong conceptual background and motivation for public action (see, for example, Robeyns: 
2005). As a matter of fact, the capability approach has contributed on this aspect by 
inspiring, for example, in Europe an “opportunity”-based approach to social security (Bonvin 
& Farvaque: 2005). These policies are based on the idea that the State should be responsible 
for guaranteeing and promoting opportunities, rather than direct levels of well-being or the 
simple materialistic provision of benefits, while individuals are responsible for using these 
background opportunities in order to lead the kind of life they prefer or value most. The 
justification for this approach goes back to Rawls’ “social division of responsibilities” which 
distinguishes between the responsibility of society consisting in ensuring “equality”, and 
individuals’ responsibility for their choices carried out within the ensured equality context 
(for an excellent survey, see Bonvin and Farvaque: 2005); see also Crocker and Robeyns: 
2010).  
In dealing with the issue of collective capabilities, Ballet, Dubois and Mahieu (2007; 2014) 
provides a novel view of responsibility which requires an explicit consideration of social 
interaction. The necessity for considering social interaction in dealing with agency can be 
traced back to the more complex concept of responsibility endorsed by the authors. Indeed, 
Sen uses the same concept of responsibility, associated with freedom of commitment, both 
for well-being and for agency (Sen: 1985, 203 ff.). Instead, Ballet, Dubois and Mahieu 
maintain that, in dealing with agency, it is necessary to consider a “richer” view of the 
subject, and this requires a “stronger” version of agency (Ballet, Dubois and Mahieu: 2007, 
187). To this end, the authors replace the analytic notion of individual, defined by freedom 
and capabilities, with the phenomenological notion of person as an individual embedded in a 
network of social relations, and consider two kinds of responsibility: the responsibility 
emerging after the action has been done (ex-post responsibility), the responsibility due to the 
individual’s capacity to assume obligations towards others stemming from his/her rationality 
and freedom (ex-ante responsibility).  Ex-post responsibility is the responsibility considered 
by Sen, ex-ante responsibility is a precondition for real freedom and characterize agency. 
Thus, “freedom of choice will have to be considered within a context of responsibilities, as 
the expression of the person’s right, and as a consequence of responsibilities assumed by 
others” (Ballet, Dubois and Mahieu (2007, 196). However, considering responsibility in a 
social context does not mean denying the importance of freedom, rather, freedom must be 
considered within a context of both responsibilities and rights as well: “…freedom of one 
person can be the counterweight of the responsibility fulfilled by another person. We do not 
say that because some people have freedom, others are responsible of these freedom, but, on 
the contrary, that because everyone is a fully responsible person fulfilling a series of 
obligations, we all benefit from freedoms and rights as a spin-off from these 
responsibilities.” (Ibidem.) Summarizing, the exercise of agency is not only determined by 
the possibility by each individual to assume and fulfill obligations with respect to other 
individuals, but it is also strongly affected by the fulfillment of responsibilities by others. 
Once the possibility that the others actions can affect the attainment of an individual’s goal is 
acknowledged, one should account for the symmetric possibility, that is the possibility that 
the individual choice can influence the attainment of others’ goals. Thus, assuming a 
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minimum of rationality by individuals,
4
 we can conclude that the exercise of freedom and 
agency occurs in a strategically interactive context, that is, in a context in which individuals’ 
choices are co-determined by the others’ choices.  
While Ballet, Dubois and Mahieu highlight an important aspect of agency, in our opinion 
their view of responsibility should be refined for the following two reasons. First, 
responsibility allows for margins of discretion. For example, in an ultimatum bargaining 
game,
5
 a proposal of 10% of the surplus is considered different, in terms of social 
responsibility, from a proposal of 50%; by contrast a proposal of 40% of the surplus is 
considered similar to the fifty-fifty proposal, from the point of view of social responsibility 
(see footnote 4). Thus, there is some latitude in individual behaviour which does not involve 
responsibility. Second, they omit to consider that (formal or informal) institutions can affect 
the nature and intensity of social interactions. Before considering these aspects in details in 
the next section, we would like to conclude with a final remark concerning Sen’s analysis of 
social interaction in a context of “cooperative conflict” (Sen: 1990; Cf. Dréze & Sen: 1989).6 
In this work Sen allows for social interaction when analyzing the household allocation of 
gains generated by labour market participation of wives. Sen calls this context “cooperative 
conflict” because it reveals both an element of cooperation and an element of conflict. 
Cooperation is justified on the ground that the attainment of household goals usually requires 
an active participation of more than one person. It is for this reason that Sen refers to the 
household arrangements as the implementation of a “social technology”.7 Conflict arises 
because there is a trade-off among household members concerning who gets what. In fact, 
once the amount of wife’s earning is given, then a conflict must be managed among all 
                                                 
4
 Rationality, intended as the capacity of an individual to effectively pursue his/her own goals, does 
not imply self-interest, see, for example, Gintis (2000, 243). 
5
 An ultimatum bargaining game is a two-player game with a proposer (P), a responder (R) and a sum 
of money X (surplus) which will be allocated between P and B only if the agents agree on the 
allocation. The game is the following: P offers the sum x to R, leaving him/herself X - x. R can accept 
the offer, or reject it, in which case both players receive nothing. In experimental analysis usually X = 
$ 10. Standard theory predicts that R would accept even the smallest amount of money rather than 
nothing, so P should propose the smallest amount of money (e.g. 1 cent). By contrast, empirical 
findings in experiments have shown that there is a “non-small” positive minimal acceptance offer, as 
many offers below $2 are rejected. The explanation for this “irrational” outcomes is that responders 
reject very low offers as they are angered by proposals that they regard as unfair (see, for example, 
Güth, Schmittberger, Schwarze: 1987; Hoffman, McCabe, Smith: 1996). 
6
 Sen considers social interdependence in agency also by introducing the distinction between realized 
and instrumental agency success (Sen: 1992, 56-57). Crocker (2009, Ch. 5) has convincingly pointed 
out that this distinction is problematic, hence we will not deal here with it. 
7
 Following Marx, Sen enlarges the view of technology by including its social dimension: “The 
making of things involves not merely the relationship between, say, raw materials and final products, 
but also the social organization that permits the use of specific techniques of production in factories or 
workshops, or on land. … Technology is not only about equipment and its operational characteristics, 
but also about social arrangements that permit the equipment to be used and the so-called productive 
processes to be carried on.” Sen (1990, Section 3). Recently, the social view of technology has been 
proposed again by Brian Arthur (2009). 
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members of the household in order to allocate the gains.
8
 Sen proposes to find the solution to 
the allocation problem by means of cooperative game theory (Nash: 1950; 1953). Within this 
analytical framework, Sen shows how the breakdown position, the perceived value of the 
well-being, and the perceived contribution of the wife to the overall opulence of the 
household affect the solution to the household bargaining problem (Sen: 1990, 469-471)). 
The motivation for this kind of analysis is that perceptions of interests and of legitimacy can 
have considerable effects on women condition.   
Interesting as Sen’s work may be, it has three main shortcomings which should be taken into 
account for a more general analysis of agency. First, the concept of “social technology” is 
more pervasive than Sen’s work suggests: it can be usefully considered not only for groups, 
like households, which usually behave in a highly coordinated way, but also for individual 
goal attainments in other social contexts. In these cases, however, different mechanisms than 
the ones effective within households, like markets or contracts, have to be taken into account 
to ensure the coordination among the relevant individuals in order to ensure the working of 
the social technology. Second, Sen is aware that the women’s decision to participate to the 
labour market is a decision which lies within the agency dimension and that within this 
context social factors play an important role (Sen: 1990, 462). However, he focuses on the 
allocations of the earnings of working wives within the household, by leaving aside the 
participation issue. Nevertheless, labour market participation of women is often the critical 
issue for women empowerment, and this decision is strongly affected by social factors as 
well.  Third, Sen uses standard analytical tools from game theory and economics, 
characterized by strict maximizer individuals. Thus, his analysis fails to go beyond the 
individualist approach and incorporate the wider social point of view called for by the 
agency approach (see Section 2). This aspect is particularly critical in dealing with the issue 
of labour market participation of women because, as already said, in this context social 
norms, customs and beliefs are crucial in determining the outcome. In Section 5 we shall 
develop Sen’s analysis by dealing with labour market participation of women within a model 
which takes into account the social dimension of individual decisions. More precisely, we 
allow that the husbands’ decision to let their wives participating in the labour market is 
determined by social interaction. Preliminarily, in the next section, we further elaborate on 
the manifold nature of social interactions and the relationship between agency and well-
being. 
4. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS, AGENCY EXERCISE AND WELL-BEING 
Nebel and Herrera Redón Nebel (2017) take up the dual view of agency as responsibility 
endorsed by Ballet et alii (2007; 2014) and enrich it with a third element inspired by the 
work of Levinas (1996), the responsability for autrui (ex-aliud).  On the basis of this 
theoretical framework, as said in the introduction, Mathias and Maria-Teresa Nebel-Herrera 
carry out a survey to operationalize this three-pronged concept of responsibility in the 
workplace of several Mexican firms. Workers’ agency is measured by quantifying their (ex-
ante, ex-post and ex-aliud) responsibility in terms of, among others, scrupulous work, 
consideration for worker mates, management of errors. We focus on a specific question of 
                                                 
8
 The cooperative conflict introduced by Sen has been known for a long time by the strategic 
management literature, and it has recently been formalized by Brandenburger and Stuart (2007).  
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the questionnaire: as a proxy for the workers’ ex-ante responsibility, it is asked what the 
reaction of the firm is in case the workers propose an improvement in their working activity 
or the organization of work, business, company or institution. Four possible scenarios are 
considered: (1) the firm implements the improvement, (2) the firm evaluates it, (3) it is likely 
the firm does not consider the improvement, and, finally, (4) the firm does not consider it at 
all. According to the results, about 20% of respondents answer (3) or (4). The possibility that 
workers have impaired ex-ante responsibility because the management does not pay attention 
to their proposed innovations or does not consider them at all confirms our view that the 
exercise of agency is deeply embedded in a social interactive context and depends upon the 
discretionary choices of others, in this specific case upon the discretionary behaviour of 
management (see Section 3).   
The questionnaire does not explain the reason underlying the unfavorable behaviour of the 
management, according to answers (3) and (4). The literature on labour market suggests an 
answer based upon an opportunistic behaviour by both the management and the workers,
9
 
that is a behaviour originated by reasons attaining to the well-being sphere of the top 
managers and the workers. In fact, according to this literature, innovative employees do not 
propose innovations as they expect to be fired after their innovation proposal, their firing 
being due to the fact that the management fear innovative employees gain a strong 
bargaining power after the introduction of the innovation (see, for example, Carmichael and 
McLeod: 1993). Within this theoretical context, Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian (2013) 
show that formal institutions can play a crucial role in reducing the scope for opportunistic 
behaviour of parties and incentivizing workers to propose innovations. In particular, they 
show that workers’ incentive to submit innovations depends upon the existence of wrongful 
discharge laws which prohibit employers from acting in bad faith with respect to employees’ 
actions. These laws, thus, are critical in limiting employers' ability to fire innovating 
employees after the innovation is successful, and enhance the employees' innovative 
incentive.  
A similar mechanism could be used to interpret the lack of attention by the management in 
the survey previously cited as a pre-emptive strategy: the top management of the Mexican 
firms involved in the survey do not consider improvement proposals because they simply 
intend to avoid a post-innovation increase in bargaining power by the innovator employees. 
It seems reasonable to claim that the observed opportunistic behaviour of the Mexican top 
managers, in reply to a potential opportunistic behaviour by innovative employees, lies 
within their margins of discretion in terms of responsibility, according to our analysis in the 
previous section; however, such behaviour affects the ex-ante agency of employees. Clearly, 
like in the analysis of Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian previously quoted, also in this case 
formal and informal institutions can play an important role in incentivizing managers to take 
into account and possibly accept improvements.  
This example shows that in an interdependent context, egoistic behaviour can affect the 
agency of individuals and that formal institutions can play a critical role in affecting the 
outcome of such interaction. This example shows also that while agency and well-being 
could in principle be taken into account as independent aspects of human behaviour, actually 
                                                 
9
 Opportunistic behaviour by management yields important market failures as it originates the well-
known hold-up problem (Williamson: 1975; 1985). 
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they are strongly related as the incapacity by workers to exercise their agency in improving 
firms’ technology originates by the very existence of an underlying strategic interaction 
among egoistic agents.  
The relationship between agency and economic performance is particularly important in 
issues concerning competitiveness of firms or nations because agency and its exertion, 
especially in terms of management of errors, acknowledgement of scrupulous work, attention 
and respect for their fellow workers, could also be instrumentally used for attaining 
economic goals or other goals connected with well-being. Firms competitiveness can be 
attained by improving the way in which workers interact one another and this interaction is 
strongly affected by their sense of responsibility. The Japanese system of production is an 
important example of how the exercise of responsibility may importantly affect firm’s 
productivity and competitive advantage. Ronald Dore has pointed out that the success of 
Japanese firms should be attributed to their Confucian cultural background which ensures “a 
more lively sense of their obligated membership in the national community than those of 
other nations” (Dore: 1983, 471; see also Dore: 1987). In the Japanese system of production, 
the sense of responsibility of workers in ensuring a smooth and innovative productive 
activity is explicitly called for by managers. For example, the active participation of workers 
to the improvement of the production process is one of the principles of the Toyota 
Production System (Cf. Womack, Jones and Roos: 2007, Chs. 3 & 4; Liker: 2004, Ch 4). It is 
also worth emphasizing that this system not only ensures a great competitiveness but also a 
greater quality of life than in mass production factories as well as in factories with alternative 
“craftmanship” organizations (Womack, Jones and Roos: 2007, Ch. 3). 
In this section, we have shown that whenever interdependent agents are taken into account, 
agency and well-being of individuals are correlated; in addition, institutions may have a 
crucial role in determining the outcome of such interaction.
10
  
5. AGENCY AS AN EMERGENT PHENOMENON 
The explicit consideration of social interactions leads to ask how individual actions interact 
and aggregate. In fact, it has been emphasized by the sociological literature (see Granovetter: 
1978; Coleman: 1986) that social phenomena can “emerge” from society, in the sense that 
they cannot be explained simply on the basis of norms, preference and beliefs of the 
members of a society, but can be explained also in terms of the way in which these norms, 
preferences and beliefs interact and aggregate.
11
 This aspect is particularly important when 
one would like to explain the heterogeneity of social phenomena in otherwise socially 
homogeneous areas. For example, gender statistics, and in particular women labour market 
participation, show remarkable differences even within culturally homogeneous areas in 
India (Sen: 1990; India Government: 2011). Thus, developing a model which provides an 
(additional and possibly alternative) explanation to these variations might be of some 
                                                 
10
 The role of institutions in affecting economic performance has been extensively considered by the 
economic literature (see, for example, North: 1990, 2005). This literature, however, does not consider 
the issue of agency. Institutions may affect agency in a deeper sense that is by shaping agents’ 
cognitive capabilities, and therefore their worldview (Cf. Gallagher: 2013; De Jaegher: 2013). This 
process is however well beyond the aim of this paper. 
11
 For a philosophical account of the role of emergence in sociology, see, for example, Sawyer (2001). 
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interest. In this section we develop Sen’s model of labour participation considered previously 
by focusing on the preliminary condition, considered warranted by Sen, concerning the 
possibility of women working. The example we provide shows that very similar societies can 
exhibit radically different rates of labour market participation of women.  
Consider two societies, say A and B, made up by 10 males and relative wives. The husbands 
are labelled 1, 2, 3, …, 10. Each husband can choose between two options, a and b; option a 
is interpreted as “letting my wife to get a job” and option b as the negation of a. Husband i 
chooses option a only if at least ni agents choose a. Number ni is said the threshold level for 
agent i  and it indicates the minimum number of  individuals choosing a which ensures that 
husband i chooses action a. The behavioral assumption underlying the class of threshold 
models
12
 is that decisions are determined by the social context in which choice is made via 
an imitation process.
13
 In this specific case, husbands think that allowing their wives to work 
is “acceptable” because they see a certain number of husbands allowing their wives to work 
(Glaeser & Scheinkman: 2001).  
 
 
Society A 
Agent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Threshold level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Society B 
Agent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Threshold level 0 1 3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Suppose that Table 1 illustrates the threshold levels of husbands in society A and in society 
B. In Society A women have a great agency as all husbands will allow their wives to work. 
                                                 
12
 Threshold models have found wide applications in explaining, among other things, diffusion of 
ideas and innovations, like unionization (Hedström: 1994), public opinion on sexual harassment laws 
(Wood & Doan: 2003) social customs (Ackerlof: 1980). This kind of models are able, therefore, to 
explain conformity, idiosyncrasy and fragility of social behaviour and, more in general, either 
transient fads or permanent choices among alternative products, sexual and marital options, scientific 
theories, and religious beliefs (for technical details on threshold models, see Granovetter: 1978); 
Schelling: 1978; Young: 2001). 
13
 Anthropologists, social psychologists, economists and sociologists have provided strong theoretical 
and empirical arguments supporting the hypothesis of imitation in explaining individual behaviour 
(see, for example, Asch: 1955; 1956; Bandura: 1986; Coleman; 1986). Surowiecki (2004) provides an 
articulated and enjoyable analysis of the role of imitation in shaping individuals’ decisions. 
Table 1 
Agency 
67 
 
In contrast, although Society B is very similar to society A, agency of women in this society 
is much weaker than in society A as only two wives are allowed to work! The reason is that 
there is not enough “critical mass” of husbands who allow their wives to work.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
An immediate implication from the previous analysis concerns the allocation of 
responsibilities among actors and institutions in a society. The analysis in Section 4 shows 
that agency can be tampered by individual actions and formal institutions which affect the 
incentive to exert agency. This implies that policy makers should be careful in designing 
their policies oriented to the equalization of opportunities as these should require a careful 
design of institutions as well. 
The example in Section 5, although extremely simple, highlights an important implication 
for policy making. In particular, the example shows how hazardous it could be to infer 
individual characteristics from aggregate outcomes (Granovetter: 1978, 1425). If we look 
only at the aggregate outcome, society B could be considered much more backward than 
society A. However, the two societies are extremely similar in terms of their fundamentals. 
Thus, unlike what intuition would suggest, only minor changes in society B’s fundamentals 
are sufficient to improve the social condition of women in this society, it being enough to 
slightly change preferences of an extremely small proportion of individuals in society 
(actually, of only one individual). This multiplier effect, whose exploitation could be crucial 
in implementing development policies, is well known by scholars working on models with 
social interactions (Moffitt: 2001), but, to the best of our knowledge, it seems to have gone 
unnoticed by the capability literature. 
So far, interaction has been considered affecting actions of different persons and the unity of 
the person has been deliberately assumed. Recently, this assumption has been challenged and 
it has been pointed out that an individual’s decisions could be considered as the outcomes of 
a very complex process and, in particular, of the interaction among different selves
14
 (see, for 
example: Elster: 1987; Aislie: 2003). Usually, this approach is very useful in explaining 
empirically relevant situations in which people knowingly choose things they will regret.
15
  
If the possibility of multiple selves is taken into account, the effectiveness of agency may be 
strongly weakened even without social interactions. This aspect of human nature seems to 
call for a deep revision of decision theory and agency theory as well.  
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